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Abstract. In the early age of the internet users enjoyed a large level
of anonymity. At the time web pages were just hypertext documents;
almost no personalisation of the user experience was offered. The Web
today has evolved as a world wide distributed system following specific
architectural paradigms. On the web now, an enormous quantity of user
generated data is shared and consumed by a network of applications
and services, reasoning upon users expressed preferences and their social
and physical connections. Advertising networks follow users’ browsing
habits while they surf the web, continuously collecting their traces and
surfing patterns. We analyse how users tracking happens on the web by
measuring their online footprint and estimating how quickly advertising
networks are able to profile users by their browsing habits.
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1 Introduction
When users surf the web an intricate network of personalisation services tracks
their preferences by following their browsing habits. These data is used to pro-
vide tailored suggestions, in terms of products users could buy, resources they
might find interesting, social connections they might be interest to form. Per-
sonalisation services sometimes rely on different techniques to track users across
different websites and applications. Many of these techniques use cookies. For
example, Google Analytics service [7] uses cookies to measure user-interactions
on websites. Another set of these techniques uses web or app sessions left open
by the user. As an example someone might decide to check their web email ac-
count and then continue to surf the web without signing out, therefore leaving
their session open. Yet another set of these techniques uses personalised fea-
tures of the user’s device or browser to restrict the pool of possible candidates
among their visitors. Features that might be used by advertising networks in-
clude personalised language or fonts settings, browser extensions and so on. By
identifying user through their accounts or unique features, analytics technologies
can distinguish unique users across multiple devices or sessions.
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2 Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Authors’ Instructions
1.1 Contribution
We have observed how users are tracked across the web and how the displayed
advertising is tailored even after they have visited a few websites with a certain
interest bias. In our study we analyse how quickly advertising networks can
identify a user and start tracking them by measuring the distance between the
measured user profile and the advertising profile. We introduce a set of metrics
to express this distance and measure the number of web sites visited after which
the distance between the advertising profile and the user profile is less then a
certain threshold.
It is important to know that we have consider the case for which users are not
registering, neither connecting any external account, as it could be the case with
services like: Facebook, Google+, Twitter, and so on. We shall also point out
that we have concentrated our study onto a single advertising network: Google.
We reserve to future studies the possibility to include and analyse also other
networks.
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
1. Introducing a model of the user online footprint.
2. Measuring how quickly a user is uniquely identified and tracked by an ad-
vertising network.
3. Introducing a measure of similarity between the user profile and the observed
advertising profile.
2 Background
Information regarding locations, browsing habits, communication records, health
information, financial information, and general preferences regarding user online
and offline activities are shared by different parties online. This level of access
is often directly granted from the user of such services. In a wide number of
occasion though, private information are captured by online services without
the direct user consent or even knowledge. We believe that the privacy and sen-
sitiveness of the information becoming accessible to third parties can be easily
overlooked.
Personal computers and more generally communication devices that are carried
around by people are capable of being located, identified and tracked across
different locations, networks and services [8]. All these devices can therefore be
used for a variety of surveillance activities, which are in itself detrimental to the
user’s interests. Until recently in fact, the cost of surveillance and tracking of
people and activities was proportional to the cost of directly reaching, asking or
following a single person or a group of people. Technology therefore enhances
the surveillance capabilities by introducing tools that allow the collection of in-
formation arising from a person’s activities. This information can furthermore
be combined and inferred, therefore offering a more complete picture of that
person.
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For example, to personalise their services or offer tailored advertising, web ap-
plications could use tracking services that identify a user through different net-
works [14] [5]. These tracking services usually combine information from different
profiles that users create, for example their Gmail address or their Facebook or
LinkedIn accounts. In addition specific characteristics of the user’s device can
be used to identify them through different sessions and websites, as described
by the Panopticlick project [4].
Browser fingerprinting is a technique implemented by analytics services and
tracking technologies to identify uniquely a user while they browser different
websites. Different features of a specific browser setup can be used to identify
uniquely a user. Supported languages, browser extensions or installed fonts [2]
can be used to identify a browser setup among others. More advanced techniques
distinguish between browsers’ JavaScript execution characteristics [9]. These fea-
tures are particularly interesting since they are more difficult to simulate or mit-
igate in practice. Targeting JavaScript execution characteristics actually means
looking at the innate performance signature of each browser’s JavaScript en-
gine, allowing the detection of browser version, operating system and microar-
chitecture. These attacks can also work in situations where traditional forms of
system identification (such as the user-agent header) are modified or hidden.
Other techniques exploit the whitelist mechanism of the popular NoScript Fire-
fox extension.This mechanism allow the user to selectively enabling web pages’
scripting privileges to increase privacy by allowing a site to determine if partic-
ular domains exist in a user’s NoScript whitelist.
It is important to note that while tracking creates serious privacy concerns for
internet users, the customisation of results is also beneficial to the end user [3].
In fact, while tailored services offer to the user only information relevant to their
interests, it also allows some companies and institutions to concentrate an enor-
mous amount of information about internet users in general. [12] investigate
user profiling and access mechanisms offered by online data aggregator to users’
collected data. Both the collected data and its accuracy was analysed together
with the user’s concerns. In their findings about 70% of the participants to the
study expressed some concerns about the collection of sensitive data, its level of
detail and how it might be used by third parties, especially for credit and health
information.
It has been shown how most successful tracking networks exhibit a consistent
structure across markets, with a dominant connected component that, on aver-
age, includes 92.8% of network vertices and 99.8% of the connecting edges [6]. [6]
have measured the chance that a user will become tracked by all top 10 trackers
in approximately 30 clicks on search results to be of 99.5%. More interesting,
[6] have shown how tracking networks present properties of the small world net-
works. Therefore implying a high-level global and local efficiency in spreading
the user information and delivering targeted ads.
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3 Modelling the user’s footprint
We model the user’s activity as series of events belonging to a certain identity.
Each event is a document containing different information. We can formally de-
fined this as a hypermedia document i.e. an object possibly containing graphics,
audio, video, plain text and hyperlinks. We call the hyperlinks selectors and
we use these to build the connections between the user’s different identities or
events. Each identity is a profile that the user has created onto a service or plat-
form. This can be an application account or a social network account, such as
their LinkedIn or Facebook unique IDs. An event is an action performed by the
user, like visiting a website or creating a post on a blog.
We aggregate keywords each time the user creates a new event by visiting a dif-
ferent url. These keywords constitute the user profile of interests (Figure 1). A
tractable model of the user profile as a probability mass function (PMF) is pro-
posed in [11, 10] to express how each keyword contributes to expose how many
times the user has indirectly expressed a preference toward a specific category.
We consider that the user expresses a preference when they visit a webpage cat-
egorised with a certain keywords. This model follows the intuitive assumption
that a particular category is weighted according to the number of times this has
been counted in the user profile.
We define the profile of a user um as the PMF pm = (pm,1, . . . , pm,L), concep-
tually a histogram of relative frequencies of tags across the set of tag categories
T .
Similarly, we define the profile of an ads in as the PMF qn = (qn,1, . . . , qn,L),
where qn,l is the percentage of tags belonging to the category l which have been
assigned to this specific advertising item. Both user and ads profiles can then be
seen as normalised histograms of tags across categories of interest. Our profile
model is in this extent equivalent to the tag clouds that numerous collaborative
tagging services use to visualise which tags are being posted, collaboratively or
individually by each user. A tag cloud, similarly to a histogram, is a visual rep-
resentation in which tags are weighted according to their relevance.
In view of the assumptions described in the previous section, our privacy attacker
boils down to an entity that aims to profile users by representing their interests
in the form of normalised histograms, on the basis of a given categorisation.
3.1 A metric of similarity
We consider the third party advertising network to operate like a recommenda-
tion system, that suggest products or services that might be of interest for the
user, based on their preferences. A recommendation system can be described as
an information filtering system that seeks to predict if the user is interested or
not in a particular resource. We assume that the ad server suggest advertising
based on a measure of similarity.
We measure the user profile, as previously described, as an histogram of their
recorded preferences, and the advertising profile as an histogram of the ads that
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Fig. 1: Here we show an example of user profile expressed in absolute terms
by counting the number of keywords in each category for a browsing session.
We model user and advertising profiles as histograms of tags keywords a set of
predefined categories of interest.
the user has received. We use the 1−norm as a measurement of how the adver-
tising network is tracking the user profile:
‖pm, qn‖1 =
∑
i
|pmi − qni|
4 Experimental methodology and results
We analysed the browsing habits of 86 users of Twitter, by observing the set of
websites they share in their feed. We assumed that the articles shared on twitter
are a subset of the website that each users visit every day. Yet if they are ac-
tive Twitter users, these websites will express their interest bias towards certain
categories. Please note that we only consider the links shared on the platform
as a sequence of website that the user might have visited. These sites are there-
fore surfed in our simulation environment. Here we pretend that a user is going
through their reading list of sites and we measure how the advertising changes
in the page and adapts to their profile. The user is simulated by a software agent
opening the urls and surfing the page for a certain arbitrary amount of time.
In our simulated environment the users are not logged in Twitter or any other
account.
For each users we analysed the websites and collected keywords for the shared
articles. We used both the meta information contained in the page, as well as
extracted keywords from the actual text of the page by using the Rapid Auto-
matic Keyword Extraction (RAKE) [13] algorithm. Each keyword was evaluated
against Open Directory Project (DMOZ) [1] for classification within top levels
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categories.
Once the user profile was calculated the advertising profile is evaluated. The
advertising profile is extracted from url parameters contained in third party re-
quests. We have considered only Google ads for the purpose of this study. These
parameters are again evaluated against DMOZ for classification within top levels
categories.
At each step the linear norm between the advertising profile and the actual user
profile is evaluated.
By profiling users’ browsing events using a hypermedia document structure
we were able to show how each event contains a set of features regarding the
user identity and the page that was visited. We have therefore categorised each
event by using the keywords contained in the meta information present in the
page and the page text itself (Figure 1). We have observed how a large and
sophisticated advertising network such as Google is able to profile users quickly
and only in a few visits (Figures 2 and 3)
Fig. 2: The figure illustrates how the norm between the advertising and the
browsing profile decrease of approximately 20% in two subsequents visits and
only in 15 seconds.
We have found how our hypermedia model is particularly suited for big data
analysis and how it allows a user to keep their online footprint under control
by understanding precisely which websites have introduced certain keywords in
their profile. Eventually this technique would allow the user to implement more
precise Privacy Enhancing Techniques (PETs) to masquerade their profile to
advertising networks.
5 Conclusions and future work
Using a hypermedia model to capture the footprint that users leave online while
surfing the web has proven a promising technique. Particularly the model is able
to capture both the single categorisation that each webpage introduce as well
as time series analytics and breaking up of third party tracking per advertising
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Fig. 3: The figure compare the 1-norm decrease for three different users in a short
timespan. This shows how, when a user surf websites in a specific category the
advertising slowly adapts to the new category and the norm decreases. When
the category changes the advertising needs to adjust again.
network. We have also shown how web tracking by large advertising networks
happens very quickly in a few subsequent visits to websites in the network (Fig-
ures 2 and 3). In future research we would like to further explore the hypermedia
model introduced, while continuing to understand how quickly web advertising
is able to match the served ads with the actual user profile. This would allow
us to understand if different profiles for the same users can be somehow linked
together within similar advertising networks. We are also particularly interested
in measuring how social networks sharing buttons and/or commenting services,
included on websites, are able to track users even when these have not signed
in with their account. We reserve the study of their capabilities to future in-
vestigations. More over we want to enlarge the set of users analysed by testing
on logs from a real world small computer network, while also introducing new
metrics to our study. In particular we are already planning to consider: 2-norm,
KL-Divergence between the advertising profile and the observed user profile,
Fisher information. We also believe in the importance to provide users with sim-
ple visualisation tools able to show the user their online footprint and allowing
them to take action to masquerade their interests profile or simply block certain
networks.
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